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A DIFFERENT KIND OF PRISONER’S DILEMMA:
THE RIGHT TO THE FREE EXERCISE OF
RELIGION FOR INCARCERATED PERSONS
Daniel T. Judge*
INTRODUCTION
Properly understood, the right to freedom of religion should encompass
broad protections for a prisoner’s free exercise to teach, practice, worship,
and observe his or her faith. Scholars typically analyze the right to freedom
of religion in two distinct ways—either as a constitutional right or as a fundamental human right. And yet, the former should be understood as a positivized protection of the latter. This Note will analyze a prisoner’s right to
the free exercise of religion in the context of a prisoner’s right to a preacher
and a place to worship. In doing so, it will separately analyze the constitutionally protected right in the United States and the internationally protected human right in the context of the European Court of Human Rights.
However, in concluding, this Note will demonstrate that the constitutional
right and the international human right are fundamentally one and the
same. And, of even greater importance, it will show that the underlying protections owed to incarcerated persons are the same, regardless of the analytical framework.
Part I will lay the foundation for the constitutional right to freedom of
religion in the United States. It will explain how the Framers understood the
right in the lead up to, and at the time of, the ratification of the Free Exercise Clause as part of the Bill of Rights. Part I will also address more modern
advances in religious liberty protections for prisoners before discussing two
recent milestones: the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Holt v. Hobbs. Part II addresses the right
to freedom of religion internationally. It begins by considering the international right to religious freedom under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and then discusses
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Philosophy, Policy, and Law, University of Virginia, 2016. I would like to thank
Professor Paolo Carozza for all of his feedback and guidance, and Professor Rick Garnett
for his valuable comments. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the Notre Dame Law
Review for their diligent edits. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their
encouragement and support. All errors are my own.
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recent case precedents in the European Court of Human Rights. Finally,
Part III offers conclusions and recommendations regarding how the right
ought to be interpreted and applied both domestically and internationally
for the better protection of a prisoner’s right to a preacher and a place to
worship. This includes both jurisprudentially in emerging cases such as Holt
v. Hobbs II and in the context of international policy through means such as
the U.S. State Department’s new Commission on Unalienable Rights.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL (AND STATUTORY) RIGHT

TO

FREEDOM

OF

RELIGION

A. Constitutional Background: The Framers’ Understanding of the
Free Exercise Clause
The text of the First Amendment is clear: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1
Since its ratification, the Free Exercise Clause has been applied to protect
“the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”2
However, in the lead up to ratification, the need for an express constitutional
protection was far from obvious.3
Prior to the First Amendment’s ratification in 1791, American states had
experienced 150 years of religious diversity.4 Furthermore, at the time of
ratification, twelve of the thirteen states already had free exercise or freedom
of conscience provisions in place.5 These laws were frequently used to protect the free exercise of religion and conscience even when they conflicted
with otherwise generally applicable laws.6 Thus, the ratification debates were
steeped in the core belief of religious freedom. This context is necessary to
properly understand the Free Exercise Clause as it was originally enacted—
with a broad interpretation.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
2 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
3 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 549–50 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Of note, the ratification debates disputed the necessity of both the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause. Id. However, this Note will only discuss the debates as they
pertain to the Free Exercise Clause.
4 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1421 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding].
5 Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 185–86 (1992) [hereinafter
McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation]. Connecticut was the lone exception only
because it had not updated its constitution and was operating under its royal charter. Id.
at 186 n.17 (citing GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776–1787, at 276–78 (1969)). While the state constitutions in place did have some limitations on the free exercise of religion, nearly all—if not all—began with the concept of
conscience with the most common limiting factor being the government’s right to protect
public peace and safety. See McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 4,
at 1459–60, 1464.
6 McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation, supra note 5, at 186 (citing McConnell,
Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 4, at 1466–73).
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One of the key differences in opinion at the time the Free Exercise
Clause was proposed and ratified was between the Federalists and the Antifederalists. On the one hand, the Federalists famously argued that the Free
Exercise Clause was an unnecessary addition to the Constitution.7 Any
amendment explicitly protecting religious freedom would not only be superfluous, but it would also run the risk of implying that a nonexpressed personal liberty was not protected.8 On the other hand, Antifederalists argued
that an express protection was both desirable and necessary. These arguments were largely promulgated by Protestant and Baptist believers who
feared that the federal government would have the ability to overpower states
and individuals without an explicit mandate not to.9 While the Antifederalists would ultimately carry the day,10 the Federalists’ arguments reveal deep
insights into the original public meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.
Professor Michael McConnell breaks the Federalists’ argument into two
distinct strands. The first strand is the argument that the government had no
place and no right to restrict the free exercise of religion.11 James Madison
himself made this argument at the Virginia Ratifying Convention.12 His June
12, 1788, paper used an observation of the current state of religious liberty as
a defense for the sufficiency of then-existing religious protections as well as
an argument against the necessity for an express provision. He commented
that “[h]appily for the states, they enjoy the utmost freedom of religion. This
freedom arises from that multiplicity of sects, which pervades America, and
which is the best and only security for religious liberty in any society.”13
Thus, the Federalists argued that a free exercise clause was unnecessary, not
because they lacked a commitment to freedom of religion as a fundamental
human right, but rather because the protection of religious liberty already
existed in its premier form.
In these same comments, Madison argued that “[t]here is not a shadow
of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its least
7 See McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 4, at 1475–76.
8 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 549–50.
9 Id.
10 Madison would later recognize that “many respectable Citizens” were “alarmed” by
the lack of a protection of conscience in the Constitution and thus (perhaps with a few
underlying political motivations intermixed) decided to work toward including the protection in the Bill of Rights. McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 4, at
1480 (quoting Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in 11 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 404, 404–05 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977)).
11 Id. at 1477.
12 Id.
13 James Madison Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 11
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 130–31 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1977), http://
press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions49.html; see also James J.
Musial, Free Exercise in the 90s: In the Wake of Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v.
Smith, 4 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 15, 15–16 & n.4 (1994) (commenting on the diversity of
religious sects in various states at the time of the Founding).
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interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation.”14 For his part,
Alexander Hamilton warned of the danger that a bill of rights could impose,
predicting it would “afford a colorable pretext to claim more than [was]
granted.”15 In other words, Hamilton argued, why declare that the freedom
of religion shall not be restrained “when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?”16 Once again, Hamilton, Madison, and the Federalists used this first strand of their argument to promote an essential
understanding of the government as it was originally framed, intended, and
understood by the public. At bottom, the government had no right to
impede the free exercise of religion. Therefore, when the protection was
eventually ratified as part of the Bill of Rights, it was seen as a positivized
safeguard for a preexisting human right, rather than as a newly established
legal right.
The second strand of the Federalists’ argument is again best summarized
by the Father of the Constitution, who wrote:
[I]n the federal republic of the United States . . . all authority . . . will be
derived from and dependent on the society, [and] the society itself will be
broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of
individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.17

Here, Madison and the Federalists believed that the structural reality of the
Constitution would prevail. A free exercise clause was unnecessary because
the nation was already so diverse and the structure of the federal government
so restrained that the personal liberties of minorities would be protected.
Today, this argument may seem unpersuasive for several reasons. First,
why wouldn’t the Federalists simply add an explicit provision, even if society
was as diverse and the Constitution as structurally restrained as they claim?
Second, religious minorities at the time still had legitimate reasons to fear
the influence of an outsized and unrestrained government. Third, a plethora or plurality of parts does not inherently protect the rights of each individual part from infringement by those in power. In fact, it would seem more
14 See McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 4, at 1477 (quoting
James Madison, Address at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 3 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881)). For his part, James Iredell offered similar
sentiments at the North Carolina ratification debates, going so far as to state:
Had Congress undertaken to guaranty religious freedom, or any particular species of it, they would then have had a pretence to interfere in a subject they have
nothing to do with. Each state, so far as the clause in question does not interfere,
must be left to the operation of its own principles.
Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 89, 90 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (statement of James Iredell); see also Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1069, 1086 &
n.66 (1998) (quoting the same).
15 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
16 Id. at 513–14.
17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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likely to lead to the undetected or unnoticed infringement of a vulnerable
minority. However, here, it is crucial to remember that up until this point
Americans had historically believed that the area of religious exercise
“should be reserved to the individual conscience” and there was no place or
role for the government in that reserved space.18 The idea of free religious
exercise as a fundamental human right was the baseline understanding that
informed the ratification debates, the framing of the Constitution, and the
subsequent proposal and ratification of the First Amendment.
The nature of the right to religious freedom at the time of ratification is
perhaps best revealed by contrasting the subtleties of the Federalists’ argument with the views of the influential John Locke. At the Founding, the idea
of religious freedom expanded beyond Locke’s notion of religious toleration
and legislative primacy.19 John Locke wrote “that all the Power of Civil Government relates only to Mens [sic] Civil Interests; is confined to the care of
the things of this World; and hath nothing to do with the World to come.”20
Locke viewed the role of government as distinct from religion. However,
Locke further stated that “Churches have neither any Jurisdiction in worldly
Matters, nor are Fire and Sword any proper Instruments wherewith to convince mens [sic] Minds of Error, and inform them of the Truth.”21 Here,
Locke asserts his notion of legislative primacy. While government and
church are separate, government comes first in worldly matters; an idea
wholly at odds with the Framers’ vision.
Professor McConnell differentiates between the Lockean view and the
American view by stating that “the former takes the perspective of government and the latter the perspective of the believer.”22 McConnell further
notes that the “paradox” of these religious freedom debates as a whole is that
“one side employed essentially secular arguments based on the needs of civil
society for the support of religion, while the other side employed essentially
religious arguments based on the primacy of duties to God over duties to the
state.”23 Therefore, the Framers expanded the idea of religious freedom
beyond Locke’s notion of religious toleration and legislative primacy.24
The underlying understanding of religious freedom in the United States
is revealed from the perspective of the believer, as opposed to that of the
government. The Federalists’ argument against the inclusion of a free exercise clause in the Constitution, the ratification debates, and this broad pivot
in political philosophy all serve to demonstrate that the right to the free exercise of religion in the United States is properly understood as a general and
18
19
20

See McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation, supra note 5, at 185.
McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 4, at 1444.
John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in JOHN LOCKE: A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 15 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010).
21 Id. at 22.
22 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 4, at 1449.
23 Id. at 1442.
24 See id. at 1444.
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fundamental human right.25 This understanding is not only what the Framers intended but also the original public meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause.
B. An Additional Constitutional Protection: The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment provides another constitutional protection
of the right to the free exercise of religion. In 1833, the Supreme Court held
in Barron v. City of Baltimore that the Bill of Rights restrained the federal government, but not state governments.26 Subsequently, the Fourteenth
Amendment passed both houses of the Thirty-Ninth Congress and was ratified in 1868.27 The Fourteenth Amendment has two relevant provisions.
The first section of the Amendment lays out the general protections:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.28

The fifth section provides the Amendment’s enforcement power: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.”29
In 1940, the Supreme Court first applied the Free Exercise Clause to the
states in Cantwell v. Connecticut.30 It did this through the process of selective
incorporation, whereby the Free Exercise Clause was incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states.31 Specifically, the Court
held that the statute in question violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
25 Much of the Framers’ intent is best understood in terms of natural law theory. Natural law theory only serves to further the idea that the right to free exercise of religion
should be protected as a general human right. It is with a heavy heart that this Note has
neither the time nor the space to delve into the application of natural law theory. For
more on natural law, see generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed.
2011). See also Christopher Hammons, State Constitutions, Religious Protection, and Federalism,
7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 226, 232 (2013) (discussing the prevalence and significance of natural law theory at the Founding).
26 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833) (“We are of opinion, that
the provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution . . . is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable
to the legislation of the states.”).
27 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 522–23 (1997).
28 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
29 Id. § 5.
30 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
31 Id.; see also McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 4, at 1484–85,
1485 n.383 (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303) (describing selective incorporation of the First
Amendment).
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Process Clause.32 The Court then held in favor of selective incorporation,
stating that “[t]he fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.”33 Since this decision, the Fourteenth Amendment has been used to
protect the right to the free exercise of religion in both judicial decisions and
legislation.34 Practically speaking, the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the right to the free exercise of religion has gradually become part of
the greater constitutional framework.
C. Advancing Religious Liberty Protections for Prisoners: The Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act and Holt v. Hobbs
In more recent years, Congress and the Supreme Court have largely
worked to expand the protections for the right to freedom of religion of
incarcerated persons. In the last two decades, two milestones stand apart: the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)35 and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Holt v. Hobbs. This Section will address each
milestone in turn, but will first begin with a survey of the ways in which the
Free Exercise Clause has been construed by federal courts to protect the
rights to the freedom of religion for incarcerated persons. Ultimately, these
developments are used to protect the fundamental human right as it was
intended and as the public understood it at the time of the Founding. As
such, the expansion of domestic protections aligns with the expansion of the
international right, both of which are to be properly understood as a broad
fundamental human right.36
In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Pell v. Procunier that “a prison
inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with
his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections system.”37 In this case, four California prison inmates and three
professional journalists filed a claim challenging the constitutionality of a
regulation that prevented members of the media from interviewing specific
inmates.38 While the Court ultimately held that the regulation was constitutional under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments, it took care to
establish significant First Amendment protections for prisoners.39 The case
itself dealt specifically with a freedom of speech challenge,40 but parts of the
holding established a broad protection under which the right to freedom of
religion has found refuge. The Court additionally held that “challenges to
32 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
33 Id. (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939)).
34 See infra Section I.C & Part II (providing examples of this protection).
35 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012)).
36 See infra Parts II–III.
37 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
38 Id. at 819.
39 See id. at 822–28, 835.
40 Id. at 821.
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prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests
must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in
accordance with due process of law.”41
In 1972, the Supreme Court took one of its biggest steps in expanding
the protection of the free exercise rights of prisoners.42 In Cruz v. Beto, the
Court held that a Buddhist prisoner could be granted relief pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment “if he was denied a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who
adhere to conventional religious precepts.”43 Of particular import, the
Court added a footnote stating that, while not every religious sect or group
must have identical facilities or personnel afforded for the exercise of their
religion, “reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without fear of penalty.”44 For the first fifteen years following this
decision, prisoners enjoyed some of the highest levels “of protection for their
First Amendment religious exercise rights in the nation’s history.”45 However, the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz tapered this
protection by rejecting “strict and heightened scrutiny for prisoner free exercise claims,”46 and instead imposing a “reasonableness” standard in relation
to “legitimate penological objectives.”47 This, in many ways, served as a precursor to the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which
“announced a new rule applying mere rational basis scrutiny in the usual case
where religious exercise was burdened as a result of a neutral and generally
applicable law.”48
Of course, the Smith decision itself is the most divisive Free Exercise
Clause issue of the day. As Professor Lund states, “[w]ith the Free Exercise
Clause, the persistently recurring issue has been whether the government
should provide religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.”49 At
bottom, this controversy is one of constitutional interpretation.50 Under a
narrow interpretation, only deliberate discrimination against religion is prohibited.51 In contrast, a broad interpretation “would provide maximum free41 Id. at 822.
42 See generally Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
43 Id. at 322–23.
44 Id. at 322 n.2.
45 Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of
RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 507 (2005).
46 Id. at 507–08.
47 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 353 (1987); Gaubatz, supra note 45,
at 507–08.
48 Gaubatz, supra note 45, at 508–09; see also Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
49 Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 482 (2017).
50 Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism].
51 See id.
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dom for religious practice consistent with demands of public order.”52 As
discussed in Section I.A, the Free Exercise Clause is properly understood
using a broad interpretation, which is consistent with the Clause’s original
public meaning.53
The Smith decision has been widely criticized for its poor use of legal
sources as well as its weak underlying theoretical argument, which many
scholars have regarded as “contrary to the deep logic of the First Amendment.”54 This ever-persisting controversy led to the creation of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)55 and RLUIPA. It continues to stand at
the forefront of nearly every Free Exercise Clause debate and lurks beneath
every post-1990 development discussed in this Note.56
Two other noteworthy developments in the ever-flowing current of the
religious liberty rights of incarcerated persons came in the cases of Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah and Young v. Coughlin. In Church
of the Lukumi, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause
‘protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment.’ ”57 The Church of
the Lukumi Court did not parse words as it voided ordinances that prevented
the ritualistic killing of animals.58 It concluded that
[t]he Free Exercise Clause commits [the] government . . . to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention
stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must
pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights
it secures.59

Although not directly a prisoner rights case, Church of the Lukumi establishes
that officials—which logically includes prison officials—cannot intervene
with the free exercise of religion merely because they distrust the practice.
Young v. Coughlin, on the other hand, is an example of a U.S. court of
appeals establishing specific protections for prisoners’ rights to the freedom
of religion. There, a prisoner claimed that he had been prevented from
attending religious services while being held in a correctional facility.60
52 Id.
53 See McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation, supra note 5, at 184–87; supra Section I.A.
54 McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 50, at 1111.
55 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.
56 The magnitude of the Smith decision makes it necessary to discuss in a Note on this
topic, but impossible to explore in a Note of this size. For varying perspectives on the
Supreme Court’s ruling and its aftermath, see generally Richard W. Garnett, The Political
(and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1815 (2011); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; and McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 50, among others.
57 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 148 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
58 Id. at 524, 526–28.
59 Id. at 547.
60 Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 568 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Among other things, the Second Circuit held that the government must show
that the restrictions for attending services or practices were “reasonably
adapted to achieving a legitimate penological objective.”61 Furthermore, it is
“error to assume that prison officials [are] justified in limiting [a prisoner’s]
free exercise rights simply because [he or she is] in disciplinary confinement.”62 This case is just one example of the many lower court decisions
providing specified protections for inmates and thereby expanding the overall free exercise protection. Both of these federal court decisions represent
the larger trend toward increasing religious liberty protections for prisoners.
All of these decisions laid the groundwork leading up to one of the most
significant protections for the religious liberty of prisoners, which came in
the form of a federal statute. RLUIPA was enacted by Congress in 2000 as a
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.63 There,
the Supreme Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress’s powers under the
provision and struck down RFRA as it applied to states.64 In the lead up to
RLUIPA, Congress documented the “frivolous or arbitrary” barriers that
impeded the free exercise of religion for incarcerated persons.65 Congress’s
enactment was a response both to the current legal landscape and to the
increasing number of empirical studies showing the extent of religious practice in prisons.66 RLUIPA was considered “a way to remove state-imposed
barriers from those seeking to minister to prisoners.”67 Given all this lead up
to its enactment, the law was viewed as an expansive protection of religious
liberty interests.
61 Id. at 570.
62 Id. (citing LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 979 n.9 (2d Cir. 1972) (“[N]ot . . .
every prisoner in segregation lawfully can be prevented from attending church services
in the chapel . . . [because] [n]ot all segregated prisoners are potential troublemakers . . . .”)).
63 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012)); Holt v. Hobbs (Holt I), 574 U.S.
352, 356–57 (2015) (explaining the history of RLUIPA); see also City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 512–13 (1997) (explaining RFRA as a congressional response to the Smith
decision).
64 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534, 536 (“Broad as the power of Congress is under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”).
65 See 146 CONG. REC. 16,698–99 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on RLUIPA) (“Whether from indifference, ignorance, bigotry, or lack of resources,
some institutions restrict religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary ways.”); see also
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 (2005) (noting congressional motivation for
RLUPIA).
66 Gaubatz, supra note 45, at 506–10, 506 & n.9 (referencing a study that found
“[r]eligious practice in prison can be very extensive with about 50% of inmates attending
religious services an average of six times per month” (alteration in original) (quoting
Thomas P. O’Connor & Michael Perreyclear, Prison Religion in Action and Its Influence on
Offender Rehabilitation, 35 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 11, 27 (2002)).
67 Id. at 511.
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Two RLUIPA provisions are of particular importance for the free exercise protections of prisoners. In the first of these provisions, RLUIPA states:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise
of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.68

The second provision defines an “institution” as “any facility or institution . . .
(A) which is owned, operated, or managed by, or provides services on behalf
of any State or political subdivision of a State; and (B) which is . . . a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility.”69
By its plain language, RLUIPA is a general and broad protection of the
right to the free exercise of religion of incarcerated persons. Congress
included broad provisions to protect this right, even at the expense of the
government. In 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c), Congress stated that RLUIPA “may
require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.”70 This provision is an example of how Congress’s intent aligned with the Framers’ intent. The Framers
sought to create the Free Exercise Clause from the perspective of the
believer, not the government.71 Thus, at times, the government would have
to subjugate its own interests in order to better protect this fundamental
human right.
RLUIPA, however, cannot fully be understood without also understanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson.72 In Cutter, a group
of current and former inmates at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction filed suit claiming RLUIPA violations.73 The petitioners alleged
that as members of nontraditional faiths they were denied access to religious
literature, group worship, dress, and other opportunities that mainstream
practitioners were afforded.74 The Court emphasized that in properly applying RLUIPA “courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries and they must be satisfied
that the Act’s prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among
different faiths.”75 It then held that a facility is free to resist a religious
accommodation if the “inmate requests for religious accommodations
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
69 Id. § 1997(1).
70 Id. § 2000cc-3(c).
71 See McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 4, at 1449; see also
supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
72 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
73 Id. at 712.
74 Id. at 712–13.
75 Id. at 720 (citation omitted) (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703
(1985)).
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become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an institution.”76
Ultimately, the Cutter Court affirmed the constitutionality of RLUIPA
while also stating that it did not read the Act “to elevate accommodation of
religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and
safety.”77 However, in the earlier case of United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that courts may not “assume [that] a
plausible, less restrictive alternative would be ineffective.”78 Therefore,
RLUIPA provides additional protections for the free exercise rights of prisoners by requiring that the state incur a burden in order to ensure the protection of religious freedom, insofar as it does not conflict with the facility’s
legitimate safety needs.
RLUIPA continues to evolve in federal district courts and courts of
appeals across the United States. For example, in Greene v. Solano County Jail,
the Ninth Circuit held that the jail’s policy prohibiting a maximum-security
prisoner “from attending group religious worship services substantially burdened his ability to exercise his religion,” as prohibited under RLUIPA.79
Once again, the court was clear that prison officials cannot “justify restrictions
on religious exercise by simply citing to the need to maintain order and
security in a prison. RLUIPA requires more. Prison officials must show that
they ‘actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures
before adopting the challenged practice.’ ”80 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has
applied RLUIPA protections to separate collective worship for minority religions and accommodations for the wearing of religious garb.81 These cases
are just a few examples of the overwhelming trend toward expanding the
protections of religious freedom rights of incarcerated persons under
RLUIPA.
One of the other significant advancements in the protection of religious
liberty rights of incarcerated persons came from the Supreme Court’s decision in Holt v. Hobbs (Holt I).82 In that case, petitioner Gregory Holt, an
Arkansas inmate, brought a suit challenging the Arkansas Department of
Correction’s grooming policy.83 Holt argued that his sincerely held religious
beliefs prevented him from shaving his beard.84 However, the Arkansas
Department of Correction’s grooming policy prohibited inmates from growing beards unless they had a dermatological condition.85
76 Id. at 726.
77 Id. at 714, 722.
78 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000) (emphasis added).
79 Greene v. Solano Cty. Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008).
80 Id. at 989–90 (quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005)).
81 See Tucker v. Collier, 906 F.3d 295, 301, 303–06 (5th Cir. 2018); Ali v. Stephens, 822
F.3d 776, 794–97 (5th Cir. 2016).
82 See Holt v. Hobbs (Holt I), 574 U.S. 352 (2015).
83 Id. at 355–56.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 356.
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Before filing suit, Holt initially requested an exception from the Department of Corrections.86 After his request was denied, Holt proceeded to challenge the grooming policy in federal district court on RLUIPA grounds.87
He represented himself pro se.88 The district court initially granted a preliminary injunction.89 However, later, “the Magistrate Judge recommended that
the preliminary injunction be vacated and [the petition] be dismissed,”
despite stating that it was “almost preposterous to think that [Holt] could
hide contraband in [his] beard.”90 The district court judge adopted the recommendation in full, agreeing with the deference the magistrate judge gave
to the prison officials.91 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that the
Department of Corrections “had satisfied its burden of showing that the
grooming policy was the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling
security interests.”92 It held that there was not substantial evidence to outweigh the “deference owed to [the] expert judgment of prison officials who
are more familiar with their own institutions.”93
Then, on September 27, 2013, Holt filed a handwritten petition for a
writ of certiorari.94 The Supreme Court entered an injunction pending the
resolution of the petition before later granting certiorari.95 Gregory Holt
had finally made it before the Supreme Court. Furthermore, for the first
time Holt had legal counsel to argue on his behalf—renowned religious liberty scholar, Douglas Laycock.96 Holt and Professor Laycock ultimately prevailed by arguing that the state agency’s policy violated RLUIPA.97 This
victory established significant, although ambiguous, precedent for the
defense of a prisoner’s right to the free exercise of religion.
In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that RLUIPA “prohibits a state
or local government from taking any action that substantially burdens the
religious exercise of an institutionalized person unless the government demonstrates that the action constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest.”98 In applying RLUIPA, the Court held
“that the Department’s grooming policy violate[d] RLUIPA insofar as it pre86 Id. at 359.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 359–60.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 360 (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 509 F. App’x 561, 562 (8th Cir. 2013)).
93 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Holt, 509 F. App’x at 562).
94 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Holt I, 574 U.S. 352 (No. 13-6827).
95 Holt I, 574 U.S. at 360.
96 See id. at 354; see also Douglas Laycock, U. VA. SCH. L., https://www.law.virginia.edu/
faculty/profile/hdl5c/2210483 (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (describing Professor Laycock’s
religious liberty scholarship).
97 See Holt I, 574 U.S. at 369–70.
98 Id. at 356.
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vent[ed Holt] from growing a [half]-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs.”99 This was an intentionally narrow holding.
Still, Holt I represents an expansion in how the right to religious freedom of incarcerated persons is understood and protected. It was a significant step in religious liberty protections for several reasons. First, Holt I was a
successful challenge to a prison policy under RLUIPA. While the decision
has, at times, been criticized for its narrow holding, it is still progress. In fact,
Justice Scalia even voiced this criticism at oral argument when he famously
quipped that he did not “want to do these cases half inch by half inch.”100
Instead, he suggested that the Court “take a case that involves a full beard”
and settle the issue once and for all.101 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
established precedent protecting a sincerely held belief under RLUIPA and
further cabined the deference owed to the security interests of prison
officials.
However, Scalia’s barb did speak to a second significance of Holt I—that
is, the Court declined to define a degree of deference owed to prison officials
under RLUIPA.102 Holt I “outlined an upper bound on the deference to be
applied under RLUIPA by rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s” application of
“unquestioning” or “absolute” deference.103 But the Court stopped short of
providing any additional clarity. In so doing, it “left open the door to inconsistent and unpredictable judicial application of Cutter deference.”104 This
ambiguity enables federal district courts and courts of appeals to apply varying levels of deference across the United States. Circuit splits on this issue
are not only possible, but probable. Thus, the fight for a consistent and universal standard is even more likely to find itself in need of authoritative
clarification.
Third, Holt I was significant because it raised awareness of the religious
liberty interests of incarcerated persons. While this final point is not legal
per se, it is important for the protection of the fundamental human right of
the freedom of religion and the free exercise thereof. Holt I garnered support in the court of public opinion. The case was widely reported and
informed Supreme Court watchers and the general public alike of the need
for basic protections of incarcerated persons.105 It informed the public of
99 Id. at 369–70.
100 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Holt I, 574 U.S. 352 (No. 13-6827).
101 Id.
102 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act—Religious Liberty—Holt v.
Hobbs, 129 HARV. L. REV. 351, 356 (2015) [hereinafter Religious Land Use].
103 Id. at 360.
104 Id. at 359–60. As the reader may recall, Cutter deference is the general concept
“that accommodations of religious practice should not be ‘elevate[d] . . . over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety,’” and warns that RLUIPA “should be applied
‘with particular sensitivity to security concerns.’” Id. at 358 (alteration and omission in
original) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005)).
105 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Ban on Prison Beards Violates Muslim Rights, Supreme Court Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/21/us/prison-beard-bangregory-holt-ruling.html; Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Holt v. Hobbs: Unanimous Victory for

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL510.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 15

a different kind of prisoner’s dilemma

9-JUN-20

13:16

2133

the dire need that many prisoners have for the free exercise of their fundamental human right to freedom of religion. In the long run, it is reasonable
to hypothesize that this will lead to an increase in similar litigation in favor of
greater prisoner protections and may even inspire future legislation safeguarding the right.
D. A New Development: Holt II
On March 1, 2019, Gregory Holt and Professor Laycock returned to federal court.106 Holt claims in Holt v. Kelley (Holt II) that the Arkansas Department of Corrections failed to accommodate his Islamic religious practices by
unlawfully preventing its Muslim inmates from observing individual prayer
services and instead forcing them to hold combined religious services with
other religious faith groups.107 Specifically, these other religious faith
groups are the Nation of Islam and the Five-Percent Nation/Nation of Gods
and Earths.108 Each of these groups has a distinct set of sincerely held
beliefs. As a result, the prison is effectively forcing inmates to choose
between practicing their sincerely held religious beliefs with other religious
groups or altogether abstaining from attending religious services.109
This case has the potential—if successful—to directly address several
issues regarding prisoner protections. First, the complaint claims the prison
violated RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment by
prohibiting separate Jumu’ah services for inmates.110 Second, the complaint
claims the prison violated these same laws by prohibiting inmates from wearing kufis outside of religious worship.111 Among other things, the Court will
need to declare whether Islam, the Nation of Islam, and the Nation of Gods
and Earths are distinct faiths. If it decides that they are separate faiths, the
Court will then need to weigh the interests and burdens imposed by each of
the two claims. Therefore, this case has the potential to decide prisoner protections regarding the sincerity of the beliefs as well as the free exercise rights
to a separate place to worship and the wearing of religious garb.
The outcome of this case will likely be determined in large part by the
type of deference the Court gives to the prison officials. While Holt I cabined
this deference somewhere below “absolute” deference, it was careful not to
provide any further definition.112 This case demonstrates the need for a
Muslim Prisoner in Religious Rights Case, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/20/holt-v-hobbs-unanimous-victory-for-prisoner-in-religious-rights-case/.
106 See Complaint, Holt v. Kelley (Holt II), No. 5:19-cv-00081 (E.D. Ark. filed Mar. 1,
2019).
107 Id. ¶ 3.
108 Id.
109 See id. ¶ 6.
110 Id. ¶¶ 102–23.
111 Id. ¶¶ 124–42.
112 See Religious Land Use, supra note 102, at 359–60.
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clear standard of deference and at the same time offers a vehicle by which
the Court may establish such a standard.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT

TO

FREEDOM

OF

RELIGION

A. Understanding the International Right to Freedom of Religion: The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention
on Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the Declaration) is largely
regarded as the most important document concerning human freedom and
dignity in the world today.113 Ratified in 1948, the Declaration’s principal
innovation is the idea “that human rights are universal, belonging to ‘all
members of the human family.’ ”114 The Declaration used dignity-based
principles to lay the foundation for regional and local legal systems to positivize fundamental human rights throughout the world.115 At the time, this
was a particularly momentous shift in thinking because it “repudiate[d] the
“long-standing view that the relation between a sovereign state and its own
citizens is that nation’s own business.”116
The significance of this global agreement in the post–World War II era
cannot be understated. In fact, despite the tense international relations of
the time, there was not a single dissenting vote when the General Assembly
voted in favor of the Declaration on December 10, 1948.117 This international unanimity provided the momentum needed to legitimize the Declaration in the eyes of the international community both then and for
generations to come. Nevertheless, in more recent years, and “[e]ven within
the international human rights movement, the Declaration has come to be
treated more like a monument to be venerated from a distance than a living
document to be reappropriated by each generation.”118
On its face, the Declaration lists a wide range of individual rights and
liberties that ought to be protected in order to protect the broader concept
of human dignity. However, as Professor Mary Ann Glendon argues, the
integrity of the Declaration is best preserved when read as a whole rather
than as a list of distinctive liberties.119 This reading protects the interrelated
nature of all the fundamental human rights contained therein. Still, the
Declaration does protect individual rights in intentional and specific ways.
113 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter Declaration]; Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1153 (1998).
114 Glendon, supra note 113, at 1162–63 (quoting Declaration, supra note 113, pmbl.).
115 See id. at 1156, 1163.
116 Id. at 1163.
117 See id. at 1155, 1162.
118 MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, at xvii (2001).
119 See Glendon, supra note 113, at 1163.
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The combined specificity and generality of the Declaration enables it to protect individual religious liberty interests in a variety of ways.
Article 18 of the Declaration states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.”120 Here, Article 18’s drafting
history helps illuminate the importance of the religious protections intended
by the Human Rights Commission and the voting member states. The Commission “had been on the verge of going forward with a draft that spoke only
of conscience and belief” until Eleanor Roosevelt, the chair of the Commission, “interjected that a text protecting religious freedom ought to use the
word ‘religion.’ ”121 Roosevelt’s view eventually prevailed within the Commission and was voted in favor of by the United Nations General Assembly.
Thus, the United Nations approved, among other things, the Declaration’s
specific protection to an individual’s right to teach, practice, worship, and
observe his or her religion “either alone or in community with others.”122
This express protection of an individual’s right to freedom of religion is
universally accepted in the Declaration but is often positivized in different
forms between regional and local systems. Jacques Maritain, one of the
authors of the Declaration, summarized this type of legal diversity best when,
in reference to the drafting of the Declaration, he said: “Yes, we agree about
the rights but on condition no one asks us why.”123 Maritain’s view is that of
a realist. While it is possible for the full spectrum of legal and cultural traditions to agree on the general form of the most fundamental rights, the philosophical, religious, or moral underpinning of each right remains highly
disputed. Consequently, so too is its specific legal form. Thus, universal,
regional, and local systems are developed with varying degrees of specificity
or generality, which is reflected in their founding texts.
In a similar vein, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht later critiqued the Declaration’s moral authority by stating that the fundamental problem is that the
Declaration’s “authority is a function of the degree to which States commit
themselves to an effective recognition of these rights guaranteed by a will and
an agency other than and superior to their own.”124 In other words, the
Declaration’s failure to apply remedies to individuals and impose duties on
states creates a space for regional and local diversity in the implementation
and protection of the right to the freedom of religion.
The generality of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights creates a
legal diversity that cuts both ways. On the one hand, by enabling a diversity
of legal protections, the Declaration empowers local and regional systems to
120 Declaration, supra note 113, art. 18.
121 See Glendon, supra note 113, at 1157, 1166.
122 Declaration, supra note 113, art. 18.
123 David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1437, 1454 (2008) (quoting GLENDON, supra note 118, at 77).
124 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (1950).
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find effective ways to protect the freedom of religion. Local and regional
systems are more able to achieve success than their universal counterparts
because they can implement legal rules that better fit the culture they seek to
influence and are typically accompanied by stronger enforcement mechanisms. However, on the other hand, these regional systems introduce variables and consequently increase the probability that some systems will fall
short of protecting the right to freedom of religion to the fullest extent possible. As such, both universal and regional systems are necessary to protect the
freedom of religion, but neither is sufficient by itself.
Established two years after the Declaration, the European Convention
on Human Rights (the Convention) serves as an example of a regional system positivizing the fundamental universal principles established in the Declaration. In fact, the preamble to the Convention states that the Declaration
“aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and observance” of
human rights.125 It also directly acknowledges that the Convention is one of
“the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in
the Universal Declaration.”126 Therefore, by its own admission, the Convention is a regional system by which the Declaration’s more general fundamental rights are specified and protected with the enforcement power of a more
localized system.127
Article 9 of the Convention protects the freedoms of “thought, conscience[,] and religion.”128 There are two sections that specify these fundamental protections. First, section 1 mirrors the protections provided in
Article 18 of the Declaration.129 As such, the Convention also establishes its
religious freedom protection from the perspective of the believer. In this
way, the Convention parallels the original public meaning of the First
Amendment.130
Second, Article 9, section 2 of the Convention cabins individual protection by specifying instances where a government has a legitimate mandate to
limit the protection of the fundamental human right. Section 2 provides that
[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.131
125 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms pmbl.,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention].
126 Id.
127 Section 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights established the European
Court of Human Rights. See id. art. 19. Article 19 of the Convention states, “To ensure the
observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human
Rights, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Court.’ It shall function on a permanent basis.” Id.
Section II.B of this Note discusses several prisoner cases decided by this court.
128 Id. art. 9.
129 Compare id. art. 9, § 1, with Declaration, supra note 113, art. 18.
130 See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
131 Convention, supra note 125, art. 9, § 2.
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But once again, the plain language of the Convention provides a perspective
from the believer’s point of view instead of the government’s, even though
the Article provides an avenue for the government to place limits on this
fundamental human right. In fact, by specifying the circumstances in which
a governmental body may interfere with the free exercise of religion, the
Convention is actually constraining the government’s ability to do so.
Given the international framework created by the universally oriented
Declaration and the regionally oriented Convention, the next question is
how these protections are practically applied to the rights of prisoners. Here,
the European Court of Human Rights has explained a prisoner’s right to
freedom of religion in express terms. In its “Guide on Article 9,” the court
stated that “national authorities are required to respect prisoners’ freedom of
religion by refraining from any unjustified interference with the exercise of
the rights laid down” therein.132 The court further stated that “if necessary,”
national authorities must also take “positive action to facilitate the free exercise of those rights, having regard to the particular requirements of the
prison environment.”133 Yet again, this fundamental right to freedom of
religion is framed from the perspective of the believer. Furthermore, the
European Court of Human Rights recognizes that civil governments may
need to protect the right even at their own expense, similar to the protection
provided under RLUIPA and the larger U.S. statutory framework.134
Regional systems of law typically mirror one another in their theoretical
understanding of the protection of a prisoner’s right to freedom of religion.
This consistency is true regardless of whether the regional system predated
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or alternatively, was adopted as a
response. As such, both local and international bodies of governance recognize the right to freedom of religion as a fundamental human right. Furthermore, all of these governing bodies recognize the prevalence and importance
of the right specifically for incarcerated persons.
In the case of the European Court of Human Rights, the regional system
uses a relatively mechanical step-by-step analysis to determine the validity of
an action that interferes with the right to freedom of religion.135 First, the
court asks “whether there is an interference with religion, thought or conscience by the state.”136 If the court finds that such interference exists, it
132

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDE ON ARTICLE 9 OF THE EUROPEAN CONHUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND RELIGION ¶ 251
(2019), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_9_ENG.pdf.
133 Id.
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c) (2012); supra Section I.C.
135 Of note, a previous work in the Notre Dame Law Review Online opined as to how the
European Court of Human Rights would analyze Holt v. Hobbs. See Francesca M. Genova,
How Would the European Court of Human Rights Decide Holt v. Hobbs?, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. ONLINE 44 (2017). It concluded that the court would be likely to hold that “the
prison’s grooming policy implicates the prisoner’s Article 9 rights.” Id. at 55.
136 Brett G. Scharffs, The Freedom of Religion and Belief Jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights: Legal, Moral, Political and Religious Perspectives, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 249, 258
(2010).

VENTION ON
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proceeds to ask “whether the interference was prescribed by law.”137 Here,
the court is effectively determining whether the state has followed “the rule
of law” in its infringement of the right.138 The law prohibiting the exercise
of religion “must be accessible, sufficiently precise, and sufficiently foreseeable in order for people to plan their activities.”139 The answer to the second
step of the inquiry “is almost always” yes.140 Next, the court considers the
state’s interest and purpose for enacting the legal prohibition. It asks
“whether the limitation adopted by the state was enacted to pursue and protect a legitimate aim.”141 Examples of legitimate aims include public safety,
the protection of rights of others, and other public order interests.142
Finally, the court asks whether the legal prohibition limiting the right to
freedom of religion is “necessary in a democratic society.”143 Within this
inquiry, the court considers the “margin of appreciation” and the concept of
“necessity.”144 The margin of appreciation is the “recognition that there may
be permissible cultural and legal variations with respect to human rights
issues,” appurtenant to any specific country.145 The necessity inquiry
involves an additional two-step examination. First, the court considers if “the
limitation is justified in principle” and therefore “correspond[s] to a pressing
social need.”146 Second, the court considers the proportionality of the
action in relation to a “legitimate aim pursued.”147
The European Court of Human Rights’s test is similar to that “used by
the United States Supreme Court for protection of fundamental rights or
suspect classifications.”148 Essentially, both tests boil down to a balancing of
interests. On the one hand, the believer has a fundamental human right to
freedom of religion and the free exercise thereof. On the other hand, a
government body has a right to limit this interest for certain legitimate aims
when using proportional and necessary means to further the legitimate aim.
Furthermore, both the United States Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights establish broad principles protecting the freedom
of religion from the perspective of the believer. The subsequent application of the
principle within each system involves a more nuanced protection, which
incorporates a greater extent of government-based perspectives.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 258 n.40.
141 Id. at 258.
142 See id.
143 Id. at 259.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Paul L. McKaskle, The European Court of Human Rights: What It Is, How It Works, and
Its Future, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2005) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308
(2003)).
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The similarities between these two systems is further evidence of the fundamental nature of the right to freedom of religion, but the differences
between the two systems are equally as noteworthy. For example, the European Court of Human Rights uses the concept of the “margin of appreciation” because of its role as a regional system that must account for a variety of
differing cultures and local legal systems.149 As a regional system, Europe is
relatively homogenous, but this flexibility in application is nevertheless necessary. Conversely, the U.S. judiciary need not account for this variegation
because it is itself a local system. This is not to be confused with the variation
of court of appeals opinions, which are always subject to Supreme Court
review. While the systems differ in many other ways, the basic balancing test
between them is the same. This is because the fundamental human right
protected by each test is the same.
B. Religious Liberty Protections for Prisoners in the European Court
of Human Rights
The remainder of this Part provides a brief outline of several cases
involving religious liberty protections for incarcerated persons in the European Court of Human Rights. Even the briefest of forays into the court’s
history demonstrates that the European system has weaker judicial protections for prisoners’ rights to the freedom of religion as compared to the
United States. This is despite having similar judicial tests and standards.
First, in direct comparison to the aforementioned Holt I, the European
Court of Human Rights has found that there is no violation of the Convention’s Article 9 protection in cases such as X. v. Austria.150 There, a prison
prohibited one of its Buddhist prisoners from growing a goatee.151 The
court upheld the prohibition in favor of the prison’s cited need to protect
the identification of the prisoner and thereby ensure public order.152 Similarly, in X. v. United Kingdom, the court offered no Article 9 protection to a
Taoist prisoner who was prevented from possessing a religious book he
ordered because parts of the book contained illustrations of martial arts.153
In this case, the court upheld the prohibition on the grounds that it was
necessary to protect the rights and liberties of others.154 In both of these
cases, the European Court of Human Rights demonstrated that it gives substantial weight to the interests of prison officials when balancing competing
interests as part of its analytical framework.
149 Scharffs, supra note 136, at 259.
150 See X. v. Austria, App. No. 1753/63, 1965 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 174 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R.).
151 Id. at 175.
152 Id. at 178, 184, 188.
153 See X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6886/75, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 100,
100–01 (1976).
154 Id.
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Another pertinent case from the Court’s recent history is Kovalkovs v.
Latvia.155 There, the applicant, Gatis Kovalkovs, alleged that “he was prevented from adequately performing the fundamental rituals of Vaishnavism
(the Hare Krishna movement).”156 Kovalkovs complained that he was not
placed in a single cell or given access to a room that he could use to pray,
read religious literature, and meditate.157 The court made two bold declarations in its opinion. First, it stated that it was “prepared to accept that there
ha[d] been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 9.”158
Second, the court stated that it was also prepared to accept that the “financial
implications for a custodial institution which can have an indirect impact on
the quality of treatment of other inmates can serve as a legitimate aim,
namely, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”159 In this second declaration, the court revealed its tentativeness to rule that an institution
may need to absorb some of the cost in order to provide its prisoners an
ample opportunity to freely exercise their faith. While this does not necessarily contradict the doctrine articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, it is at the
very least rhetorically divergent.
The court ultimately held that Kovalkovs’s claims were “manifestly illfounded and must be rejected,” despite having just stated that it was prepared to find an Article 9 violation.160 In rejecting the prisoner’s claims, the
court stated that when prison officials offer the use of a separate premises for
performing religious rituals on at least one occasion “and the applicant
refused that offer without any apparent reason, the balance between the
legitimate aims sought to be achieved and the minor interference with the
applicant’s freedom to manifest his religion has clearly been achieved.”161
Thus, the court determined that the prison’s offer of a residential area for
Kovalkovs’s religious practice was sufficient, even if Kovalkovs found the
space inadequate and refused it the first and only time it was offered.162
This decision lays a precedential trap for the incarcerated believer. If
the prisoner denies an opportunity for a space to worship, even just once, he
is no longer entitled to an accommodation for that specific practice. And
yet, if he accepts the accommodation in the first instance, the court will say
he has been accommodated and therefore is not entitled to any additional
accommodation as it relates to that practice.
Kovalkovs v. Latvia, alongside X. v. Austria, X. v. the United Kingdom, and
many other cases, reveals that the European Court of Human Rights provides
a limited protection of the right to the freedom of religion for incarcerated
155 See Kovalkovs v. Latvia, App. No. 35021/05, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 31, 2012), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109099.
156 Id. ¶¶ 1, 9.
157 Id. ¶ 60.
158 Id. ¶ 63.
159 Id. ¶ 64.
160 Id. ¶ 69.
161 Id. ¶ 67.
162 Id. ¶ 15.
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persons. There are, of course, instances in which the court has found Article
9 violations for prisoners. A common—and relevant—example of Article 9
violations is when prisoners are denied access to a priest or preacher of their
faith. For example, in Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, the court held that there was an
Article 9 violation after a death row inmate was denied from participating in
weekly religious services and was prevented from visiting with a priest for at
least a period of several months.163 The court has a strong precedential history of defending the right to a preacher or priest under Article 9.164 However, as evidenced above, the court has many other troubling precedents that
restrict the free exercise of religion for prisoners.
Compared to the U.S. judicial system, the European Court of Human
Rights generally gives greater deference to the interests of its sovereign members. This is likely due to its status as a regional system. Still, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the U.S. Constitution, and the European Convention on Human Rights all recognize the right to freedom of religion as a
fundamental human right. Consequently, in application, these systems
should protect the right to the same extent, or at the least should be more
closely aligned.
III. APPLYING FREEDOM OF RELIGION TO PRISONERS: RECOMMENDATIONS
HOW COURTS AND POLITICAL BODIES SHOULD CORRECTLY
UNDERSTAND AND APPLY RELIGIOUS LIBERTY RIGHTS
TO PRISONERS

FOR

Political bodies and courts alike should seek to provide broad protections for a prisoner’s right to the free exercise to teach, practice, worship,
and observe his or her faith. This Part will provide a series of brief recommendations for how the U.S. judicial system, the European Court of Human
Rights, and the Commission on Unalienable Human Rights should protect
the right of freedom of religion for incarcerated persons.
The United States Judicial System. First, courts in the United States should
continue to interpret and apply the First Amendment broadly, as it was originally intended and is consistent with its original public meaning.165 A broad
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause is necessarily from the perspective
of the believer, not the government.166 Furthermore, the First Amendment
must be read with the general understanding of the right to freedom of religion at the time the Amendment was conceived, as a broad and fundamental
human right.167 This human right equally applies to incarcerated persons.
The government must satisfy the same burdens before it infringes on the
fundamental human rights of prisoners as it would for any other group of
163 See Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 89, 128–30.
164 See Mozer v. Moldova, App. No. 11138/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 197–99 (2016), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-161055; Kuznetsov v. Ukraine, App. No. 39042/97, Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶¶ 143–51 (2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61060.
165 See supra Section I.A.
166 See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
167 See supra Section I.A.
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people. The only difference in the context of incarcerated persons is the
nature of some of the competing interests.
Second, and similarly, RLUIPA should be interpreted and applied
broadly, just as its plain language requires and as it was intended at the time
of enactment. This should include fundamental protections within the right
to freedom of religion and the free exercise thereof. For example, properly
understood the protections should include the right to a preacher as well as
the right to a place to worship. While prison officials should receive deference for prison security concerns, these must be legitimate aims accomplished by the least restrictive means. Cases like Holt v. Hobbs have helped to
properly interpret and expand the protections under RLUIPA, but they have
not gone far enough. The question of deference owed to security concerns is
likely to continue to split courts of appeals until it inevitably boils to the surface of the Supreme Court’s docket. When that day comes, the Supreme
Court should make its decision with an emphasis on the perspective of the
believer, just as the Framers envisioned when drafting the First Amendment
protection.
The European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human
Rights offers substantive protections for the right to freedom of religion, similar to those provided in the U.S. system. However, the court has often fallen
short in application. Even a cursory glance at the court’s precedents show
that the European system has frequently interpreted Article 9 of the Convention narrowly when applying it to incarcerated persons. Consequently, the
court has curtailed the rights of prisoners to teach, practice, worship, and
observe his or her faith throughout the regional system.
The court should interpret Article 9 consistent with its original intent.
In so doing, it must look to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its
preamble, and the drafting history of the Declaration’s Article 18 to supplement the plain text of the Convention. Furthermore, a proper understanding of the right to freedom of religion involves understanding the
Convention as an instrument that uses its specificity to bolster the protection
of the rights listed therein rather than as a limitation or constraint.168 By
detailing the limitations of each right, the Convention effectively cabins the
limitations for each right. Thus, a government cannot invoke a limiting principle that is not expressly mentioned.
The Convention, like the United States Constitution, RLUIPA, and the
Declaration, generally seeks to broaden the scope of the free exercise of
religion. This underlying intent should be applied to prisoners equally. The
analytical framework used by the European Court of Human Rights is akin to
that used by U.S. courts under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. In order
to preserve the intent of the drafters and the ratifying countries, the court
should construe Article 9 to include comparable protections for prisoners.
Mainly, the court should analyze issues with greater deference to the believer
168

See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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and less deference to the stated interests of prison officials. This proper balance will help restore prisoner rights to a preacher and a place to worship.
The Commission on Unalienable Human Rights. On July 8, 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the establishment of a new advisory
commission.169 The Commission on Unalienable Human Rights was created
to provide “advice and recommendations on human rights to the Secretary of
State, grounded in our nation’s founding principles and the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.”170 Furthermore, the Commission’s charter
states that it is not charged with discovering new principles, but rather with
providing “advice to the Secretary for the promotion of individual liberty,
human equality, and democracy through U.S. foreign policy.”171 The State
Department’s official notice also stated that the Commission is expected to
“provide fresh thinking about human rights discourse where such discourse
has departed from our nation’s founding principles of natural law and natural rights.”172
The Commission provides a unique opportunity to bridge the gap
between domestic and international understandings. These two understandings of the right to freedom of religion ultimately converge because they
each view the free exercise of religion as a fundamental human right, regardless of any differences in their analytical frameworks. The Commission’s
mandate explicitly cites the nation’s founding documents and Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the grounds for the human rights it is to consider. In the context of the right to freedom of religion, this encompasses a
broad, believer-focused right.
The Commission should understand the right to freedom of religion in
this way, and thereby recommend that the rights to a preacher and a space to
worship be expressly protected as part of the fundamental human right. By
making this type of recommendation, the Commission will increase the religious liberty protections of prisoners in several ways. First, if adopted by the
Secretary of State and the President of the United States, these fundamental
protections will become part of U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, the protections will be more likely to be adopted by allies and negotiating partners
and thus more likely to receive consideration from international bodies such
as the United Nations.
Second, if these policies are recommended by the Commission and subsequently adopted as part of U.S. foreign policy, prisoner rights to a preacher
and a space to worship will be significantly more likely to become part of U.S.
domestic policy as well. This, of course, will not change the legal interpreta169 Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, Remarks to the Press (July 8, 2019), https://
www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-3/.
170 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CHARTER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE COMMISSION ON
UNALIENABLE RIGHTS ¶ 3 (2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
Charter-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf.
171 Id.
172 Public Notice of Department of State Commission on Unalienable Rights, 84 Fed.
Reg. 25,109 (May 30, 2019).
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tion of the First Amendment or RLUIPA, but it will focus popular opinion on
the issue while simultaneously reeducating the public on the Framers’ intent
and the original public meaning of the right to freedom of religion.
At bottom, the Commission has been given the objective to advise the
Secretary of State on matters concerning unalienable human rights. A prisoner’s right to freedom of religion encompasses a cross section between the
international and domestic understandings of the right as a fundamental
human right while also involving one of the world’s most vulnerable populations. The Commission has the unique opportunity to further establish the
free exercise of religion as a fundamental human right, just as it is properly
understood.
CONCLUSION
The right to the free exercise of religion is properly understood as a
fundamental human right. In the context of the United States, the Framers
recognized the relative importance of this protection in the hierarchy of
human rights and drafted the First Amendment accordingly. Since then,
courts and legislatures have sought to protect the free exercise of religion by
interpreting and applying the First Amendment broadly as well as by enacting legislation such as RLUIPA. Internationally, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights established a similar understanding of the right to freedom of
religion in 1948. Subsequently, regional systems like the European Court of
Human Rights have applied this right in a variety of different ways. At their
core, these legal instruments and judicial bodies are intended to protect the
same fundamental human right. International courts, U.S. courts, and wellpositioned political and legislative bodies should continue to advance the
proper understanding of the right to the free exercise of religion and apply it
to at least one of the world’s most vulnerable populations—prisoners.

